Plato’s Meno - What is virtue?

The ancient ruins of the Parthenon, Athens, Greece

The following analysis of Plato’s Meno is based on the translation of G.M.A Grube, found in The Complete Works of Plato, edited by John M. Cooper.

Common in most Platonic dialogues, there is a preface or build-up of some sort regarding a conversation that is to be had on a given subject. However, what we find in Meno is no introduction at all; rather, it starts fairly abruptly by Meno promptly asking Socrates, Can virtue be taught? Can we learn it by practice, or do some people have it by nature, and therefore it can neither be taught nor gained by experience? 

Meno is a very important interlocutor within this dialogue. Meno hails from Thessaly, which is friendly to Athens, of which they share common political interests. The significance of the interlocutor of Meno cannot be understated. Meno is a young man looking to embark on a long career in politics, and as such, would naturally want to know what virtue is. The reason for this is that how Meno displays said virtue directly affects his political career, which he so desires. So, to have a long one, not only does he have to be virtuous in his leadership, but he has to know what virtue is. This is crucial for Meno because whether he has virtue directly affects how he leads and governs others, through a political position. As such, he has come to speak to Socrates about the nature of virtue, so he can have a good and prosperous career in politics. A quick note to add, Meno comes from an aristocratic family and by nature is aristocratic. What is interesting to point out here is that Socrates, growing up in a democratic society, was suspected of leaning towards being aristocratic in his political views. Though he wasn’t, he was thought to be sympathetic to the aristocracy of his day.

Socrates’ association with prominent citizens, such as Alcibiades and Critias, often leads to interpretations of him as embracing certain aristocratic ideals. This becomes all the more apparent when we realise that Alcibiades, driven by personal gain and power, defected to Sparta and was seen as a traitor by the Athenians. Whereas Critias was one of the thirty tyrants who overthrew the democratic regime. Nonetheless, Socrates’ disdain for wealth and status, as evident in his teachings, aligns more closely with a democratic ethos than with aristocratic principles. He famously stated that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” promoting a life of virtue and wisdom over one of privilege. Caring very little for wealth, property, and fame, he cared more for wisdom and virtue. This strong desire for wisdom and virtue and disdain for wealth and luxuries doesn't allow for him to be aristocratic in his social standings nor beliefs.

Socrates’ ideals were more in line with a wise and virtuous life, and such a state ought to be governed by said principles. This lies in stark contrast with the democratic (rule by the many) and with the aristocracy (ruled by a family). As such, Socrates wouldn’t have advocated for either regime, because they both clash with his ideals. Socrates didn’t believe power should reside with the majority without recourse to wisdom and reason. Likewise, he wouldn’t believe power should lie with someone just because they come from a certain family, because said family doesn’t always have a recourse to wisdom and virtue. However, the life of being guided by wisdom and virtue is indifferent to both regimes.

Having covered a little context where there was none, let’s discuss the nature of virtue, according to Socrates and Meno. 

The discussion begins

So, as mentioned, Meno begins the discussion by asking Socrates, Can virtue be taught, learned through experience, or is it something inherent that only a few possess. To which, Socrates, in rather Socratic irony, says he doesn’t know what virtue is, never mind its nature. This is very much in line with Socrates in how he believes he doesn’t know anything. Had he provided an answer, it would assume that he knows what virtue is, when he doesn't. So, as a compromise, Socrates and Meno undergo the Socratic method to determine what virtue is. To demonstrate his ignorance regarding virtue, he provides an example. The example being, if Socrates doesn’t know Meno, can he also describe qualities peculiar to Meno that are true? The answer is no. In like manner, Socrates, not knowing what virtue is, cannot describe its nature.

The interesting thing about Socrates professing not to know anything (in this case, virtue) is that he is acutely aware of the limitations of his knowledge. Where he is deemed wise, much to his dismay, is his sheer awareness of this. Furthermore, even if Socrates knows what virtue is and its nature, rather than giving a straight answer, he invites others into a dialectical discussion. By doing so, Socrates believed that by using his Socratic method, he could elicit the truth out of someone and himself. As will be demonstrated later on, this form of questioning is a type of wise guidance. So, Socrates endeavors to put Meno under this form of wise guidance. To which Socrates begins by asking Meno what virtue is, since Socrates is in dire ignorance.

Menos’ first answer - virtue is acting in one’s natural role

Meno’ first answer as to why virtue is a form of natural duty that one has to do, which is by their sex or stage of life. As such, Meno’s response sees virtue as a dynamic duty that scales with sex, age, activity, and profession in life. We can see that virtue, at least according to Menos’ first response, is relative to the individual, which scales following where they are in life. To better illustrate his point, he gives many examples for men, women, children, etc, which are the following;

For a man, virtue is the ability to manage public affairs, of which by doing so he benefits his friends and harms his enemies, whilst avoiding harm to himself. The virtue of a woman is to take care of the household, preserve the possessions, and be submissive to their husbands. Of which this different kind of virtue goes for a child, an elderly slave, etc. It is quite evident here that Meno sees virtue as a natural function that one must act and perform a duty by their natural endowment. No matter the station, sex, or occupation in life, one, according to Meno, must act from their natural virtue. For a politician, it would be to enact laws, etc. In my mind, it seems as though Meno has both a natural virtue in mind, that of men and women, but also a profession or occupation of virtue, too. In this way, I believe Meno’s first answer is based on a dynamic and changing view of virtue, which isn’t inherently static. This dynamic and relative view on virtue is at odds with someone who believes there is a universal virtue that we all ought to attain, which is the same for everyone, and therefore is fixed and absolute. 

This first answer, being relative, seems like one can virtue as subjective, without being subject to a universal standard. But this response is overly simplistic and vague. In effect, it doesn’t describe what virtue is, but rather an example of virtuous actions. Furthermore, this conforms to relativism, which can lead to a misunderstanding as to what virtue is by nature.

Whilst Socrates finds Meno’s response somewhat admirable, Socrates is looking for what virtue is, not a multitude of examples of virtue. In essence, Socrates wants to get at the very heart of what virtue is; there may be many virtues, but Socrates is more concerned with virtue in and of itself, not a part of it. To clarify what Socrates means by this question, he suggests that if one was looking to understand the nature of bees, one wouldn’t say how bees differ from one another; they would describe the nature of a bee that applies to ALL bees. Socrates, to drive home his point to Meno, provides many more virtues that apply to both men and women, children, and slaves. Some of these include strength, health. It is evident that Socrates is not interested in the semantics and examples of a thing, but what the thing is, that universal and applies to all, including their examples of said thing. 

What can be seen based on this first answer is a difference between arriving at the truth of virtue and things in general. Meno is concerned here with arguing from a particular and working his way up to understanding what virtue is. As such, Meno arrives at a relative take on virtue by giving examples of virtue relative to one’s sex, profession, and natural endowment. Socrates, on the contrary, believes virtue is a universal standard applicable to all that included potential additional aspects of virtue. Socrates is concerned about what virtue is, which supersedes all examples, as the parts are a part of the whole. Socrates is interested in the whole, not the part of virtue. Based on this, though admirable and generous, on these grounds, Socrates finds Meno’s first response inadequate.

Meno’s second answer - justice and how virtue is ruling over others

Having discussed why Menos’ first response wasn’t sufficient to define virtue, the conversation shifts to ruling over others, to which justice is discussed.

Both Meno and Socrates go on to discuss the nature of ruling a household and ruling a city. What immediately comes to mind is justice. Both men agree that justice with moderation is needed in ruling a household and a city, to which failure to have such traits would imply that the city and household cannot be run well. So, what is evident justice is a necessary component when it comes to ruling over people. Remember, this conversation of leadership appeals strongly to a young Meno who is looking for a career in politics. Justice is key because it falls under virtue. So if one were to rule justly, they would, by extension, be virtuous. By ignorant and a lack of virtue would lead a state and person to ruin, whereas virtue would lead it to grow, health, and prosperity. 

So, it is agreed between both Socrates and Meno that justice and moderation are key to ruling well, whether that is over a city or a household, all is the same. Furthermore, it is also agreed that both men and women, young and old, can possess moderation and justice. Since justice and moderation, and others are a part of virtue, which are the same irrespective of sex or profession, anyone can have virtue. But as we have previously shown, Socrates is not looking for a part of virtue, which justice and moderation are, but what virtue is as a whole. Socrates and Meno agree that by possessing virtue and its qualities, such as justice, they are good, but if they lack the qualities and, by extension, virtue, they are bad. After briefly discussing the qualities and virtues and virtue is the same regardless of sex and otherwise, Meno suggests that virtue is ruling over others.

Socrates unsurprisingly views this second answer as insufficient and, here’s why. 

As has been demonstrated prior in the conversation with Meno, anybody who possesses the qualities of virtue is virtuous by nature. This universal application applies to a slave also, but a slave is also someone who is ruled and not a ruler, yet, as Meno admits, anyone can possess virtue, including slaves. For example, a slave can be just and moderate, and good. But according to Meno, virtue is ruling over others, but how can this be so for a slave? Meno appears to contradict himself, because on the one hand he says, virtue can be possessed by anyone, yet virtue is ruling over others, which a slave is ruled by.

By using this example, Meno either has to abandon one of two positions. He either has to part ways with the virtue is ruling over others or virtue can be held by anyone; he parts ways with the former. This is proven more evident when we consider that people who rule can become bad tyrants and lack virtue. Therefore, virtue cannot be simply ruling over others, so Meno compromises and suggests that virtue is ruling justly, which rules out a bad man. Seems reasonable, but again, Socrates is not satisfied; it appears we come full circle back to the last objection of Meno’s first answer. The issue at hand is that Socrates is not looking for a part of virtue to describe what virtue is as a whole, but rather its whole. So, since justice is a part of virtue, this answer of ruling justly is ruled out in describing what virtue is. Simply ruling wasn’t enough, nor is ruling with justice enough to define virtue, the former because anyone can rule, including bad people. Nor is it the latter since justice is a part of virtue, but we want to know what virtue is that applies to all parts of virtue, including justice. 

I believe Socrates is correct in raising such objections. We want to know what virtue is as a whole, not its parts, which Meno has only provided. Virtue is a universal standard that governs all good actions and qualities of actions. But we cannot understand virtue as a whole by only look at examples of it. When we want to understand a chair, we cannot simply look at one leg. We need to see all its parts, and the essence of what gives the name, chair. 

Yet again, Socrates, to drive home this point to Meno regarding parts of virtue, of those that are not of interest to Socrates in relation to finding what virtue is as a whole. Socrates provides even more examples, this time using shapes and colour as an example.

Say, for instance, one wanted to know what shape and colour are, we wouldn’t give an example of a shape or colour, but rather define what colour and shape are that apply to all shapes and all colours. For example, when asking someone what a shape is, and they say circle, they wouldn't be describing what a shape is that describes all shapes, but only an example using circles. For Socrates, the part doesn’t define the whole, but the whole defines the part. 

So far, the answers provided have proven to be insufficient for Socrates, because they describe the part of virtue and not its whole, of which Socrates is more interested. Ruling over others is an unsatisfactory answer because both a slave and a ruler can possess virtue, of which also being just is not a correct answer because it gives a part of virtue (justice) to describe its whole (virtue). Having been refuted Meno proceeds to provide a different answer as to what virtue is. It is quite evident, based on what we have seen so far is that Socrates is arguing from a universal perspective, in which a definition or nature of a thing describes its potential parts. Socrates is less interested in the parts when describing what a thing is in and of itself. Meno uses particulars to describe what the whole is. Both men aim to understand what virtue is, but from different approaches. Socrates wants a fixed definition of what something is; Meno inclines to a more relativistic approach, in which definition and application of virtue vary.

Let’s move on to the third answer, which Meno gives.

Menos’ third answer - virtue is desiring beautiful things and the power to acquire them

Following on from the previous answers, Meno suggests that virtue is desiring beautiful things and having the power to acquire them. Socrates and Meno then agree that people can desire good and bad things. Moreover, it is agreed that some people know what is good and desire it, while some people desire what they think is good but is bad. In the case of the latter, they lack true knowledge of what it is they desire, because whilst thinking it to be good, it is bad. And as we have seen, what is good is virtuous, what is bad is not.

So, if a man attains what is bad, they are not virtuous, and therefore, simply desiring beautiful things and having the power to do so cannot be virtue by itself. This is because if someone lacks the knowledge of what they believe to be beautiful, they unwittingly attain what is bad. So, to simply suggest that virtue is desiring what is beautiful isn’t sound when one lacks true knowledge. With this lack of knowledge, the ignorant man won’t know how much harm a bad thing he desires that he believes to be good. For all he knows, what he is desiring is good, but in reality it is bad, but owing to his ignorance of it being bad, he lacks the knowledge of what harm he could do to himself.

Furthermore, it is noted that if a man doesn't know that a thing is bad, he cannot desire what is bad, because he lacks knowledge of what is bad. Likewise, he wouldn’t know what is good if he were ignorant of what is good. Seeing as though what is evil brings misery and harm, it can hardly be supposed that someone willingly wants things that are harmful and cause misery to himself. So, seeing as though misery and harm are bad, to which nobody would consciously desire, no one desires what is bad. They get what is bad by being ignorant of the knowledge of what is bad.

Based on what has been said thus far, the desiring aspect of Meno’s answer is called into question. Socrates notes how anyone has the desire for anything, whether young or old, wise or ignorant. And seeing as though this desiring aspect is shared by anybody, including a ignorant man, they can desire what is bad unknowingly which, as we have seen, is virtue, because virtue is what is good. So, to put it simply, virtue cannot simply be a desire for beautiful things. But what about the power to acquire these things in Meno’s response?

So, having disputed virtue as simply desiring beautiful things, Socrates asks Meno, Is virtue the power to acquire beautiful things, to which Meno says, Yes. Well, as with the first part of his statement, Socrates also sees fault in this part as well.

To better clarify what he means, Socrates probes Meno, to which he is asked to do just that, to clarify what he means. Socrates asks, Do these beautiful things include health and wealth? To which Meno says yes. What about gold and silver? Yes. But seeing as though a bad or ignorant man can possess such power to attain these things, whilst lacking true knowledge of what is truly beautiful. Socrates and Meno then agree that an element of impiety and injustice when acquiring said things is wickedness. To which, as was agreed upon before, virtue is what is good, and injustice is bad. Virtue is not injustice so therefore, an unjust man cannot possess virtue. With this in mind, we can see how someone with the power to acquire things can have either virtue or injustice and is therefore good or bad, respectively. So, simply saying virtue is the power to acquire these things is not enough. 

So, as a compromise, Meno and Socrates suggest that virtue is acquiring these things whilst being just and moderate, but here lies a problem: Meno is providing Socrates with a part of virtue to describe virtue as a whole. Socrates, as mentioned, is not looking at it as parts to define virtue. So, as a result, they are back to square one again.

Meno so far has only provided Socrates with parts, actions, to qualities of virtue, not what virtue is as a whole. All of which have been proven to be insufficient in defining what virtue is as a whole. It appears that both men are at a loss as to what virtue is. After some friendly jabs and jokes, with which Meno suggests Socrates is like a torpedo fish, and Socrates describes how truly perplexed he is, both men return to the issue at hand once more. A quick thing to note about the perplexed state Socrates finds himself in. Socrates is accused by Meno that he intentionally perplexes others, to which he is like a Torpedo fish, stinging anyone he comes across with perplexity. In defending himself, Socrates suggests he doesn’t do this on purpose, because he is genuinely perplexed about such things. As a result, others share this state of perplexity, which this state, comes from Socrates not knowing anything. As such, Socrates invites people to join him on his quest for truth, which they agree to, which can be perplexing. 

The theory of recollection

Socrates and Meno are at this point utterly at a loss as to what virtue is; Socrates and Meno are as perplexed as each other. What has been described so far are parts of virtue, or things that are not virtue. As such, Meno returns to the original question with which we opened up the dialogue with. Meno asks Socrates once more, Is virtue taught, is it what we already have, or do we get it through experience? Socrates agrees to return to this point, but Meno complains that if a man knows what he knows, he does not need to search for the thing he already knows. However, if he does not know, how can he search for something that he does not know? Socrates disagrees with this line of argument and endeavors to show why.

It is here that we come to the infamous theory of recollection, though found in greater detail elsewhere in The Phaedo, a brief discussion is found here. Socrates mentions how he has heard many poets and diviners talk about how the soul is immortal. The soul is again and again reborn, collecting knowledge of previous lifetimes; as such, any form of learning or knowledge we attain is from a previous life. When we “learn new knowledge,” we are merely recollecting what we already know. For Socrates, we don’t learn, but rather remember the knowledge that lies latent within our immortal soul. To demonstrate this, Socrates asks Meno to bring over one of Meno’s house attendants to prove this notion.  

A depiction of Socrates

So, to prove his point, Socrates provides a series of mathematical and geometrical puzzles to solve. Although a little hesitant, the young attendant agrees and takes part. The whole point of the exercise was for Socrates to draw out of the young man the latent knowledge he has within his soul regarding these puzzles. Previously and throughout the exercise, the young man didn’t know about certain problems, yet with a little questioning, Socrates was able to elicit correct answers out of him. All this was done on the boy’s account, without anyone giving him any correct answers to help him.

Socrates assures Meno that with the correct questions to guide someone, we can elicit any true answer we can out of someone, namely because their soul has said knowledge about these things. So, at first, a man would claim that he doesn’t know (forgetting the knowledge within his soul), but in time, with correct questioning, we extract the correct answers out of him. In doing so, a man can come to know what he previously didn’t know, again, re-remembering what the soul already knows. This is shown in the case of the attendant coming to true knowledge about the puzzles and revealing correct answers by the Socratic method.

Socrates and Meno agree that if the soul knows and has such knowledge about say, mathematics, they must have always possessed it. But if they have not been taught this in this life, yet they have always had this knowledge, then they must have had it before birth. When agreed, the only other answer is that the soul is immortal and has always possessed such knowledge in previous lifetimes, which is carried over into this one. 

In somewhat of a long and arduous way, Socrates has answered how to attain knowledge, mainly through recollection. We have answered the question of whether a man can come to know what he didn’t already know, namely, through recollection. So yes, a man can come to know what he previously didn’t know by learning, but by learning we mean recollection of the latent knowledge we have within the soul. 

This, at a glance, seems quite satisfactory; however, they have not described what virtue is, but rather they have described its qualities, and knowledge is recollection. They have both described what knowledge is and how we attain it. But Socrates is still in doubt as to whether virtue is knowledge. Meno again urges Socrates to return to the original question, but Socrates is reluctant because Meno is asking for qualities of virtue, not what virtue is as a whole. However, Socrates relents and endeavors to question Meno more.

Is virtue knowledge? And is it teachable?

I believe, thus far, that Socrates has answered the question as to whether virtue is innate, which it is. The reason for it being innate is that the soul experiences many lifetimes and has gained knowledge and experiences, including virtue. Though Socrates doesn’t believe that people are virtuous by nature, simply because we forget at birth the prior knowledge we had, including virtue. However, virtue is latent within the soul; the reason we are not virtuous is that we forget this bit of knowledge. It is only until someone “learns (remembers)” this innate knowledge of virtue that we become virtuous. Socrates goes on to say that a man who does not know, already knows within him, but at the time of lacking knowledge (not knowing), he is unaware of this latent knowledge which he already has. With guided questioning, the man who did not know can come to know what he has always known. But if we have always had this knowledge within the soul, it must have lived many lifetimes, therefore making it immortal.

With this in mind, we return to the dialogue in which both Meno and Socrates try to answer the question of whether virtue is thought or not.

First, they endeavor to answer whether virtue is a form of knowledge and, therefore, teachable. It is agreed by Socrates and Meno that knowledge is something that can be taught. So, if virtue is a form of knowledge, it can, by extension, be taught. However, if virtue isn’t knowledge, then it is not teachable. With this in mind, they get into the discussion concerning whether virtue is knowledge. 

Virtue, it is agreed, is what is good, and as such, makes one good and gains all sorts of good benefits from being virtuous. It is also understood that knowledge is a form of good, but if virtue being good is separate and different from knowledge, then it isn’t knowledge. However, if both virtue and knowledge are good as agreed, and knowledge encompasses all goods, including virtue, then virtue is knowledge. With this in view, Socrates begins to work off this framework, namely, whether virtue is a good separate from knowledge or a part of knowledge that also makes it good. If it turns out that knowledge encompasses virtue, then it is knowledge and can be thought. If, however, it is separate from knowledge and good independent of it, then it is not knowledge but something else. Virtue and knowledge share in common with what is good; that much is agreed. 

Socrates and Meno begin to use this framework to see whether virtue is knowledge and thus teachable.

To begin with, Socrates names off a few of many things that benefits us, whilst at the same time they can bring us harm. For example, courage is an innately good virtue, but too much courage, too much of this good thing, can bring us harm, namely by being too rash and reckless. This dualistic nature of what is good can also what bring harm is exemplified more when incorrect use of these things occurs. As such, it is quickly understood that a certain level of understanding of this nature and how to put them to use properly is what is needed. This correct understanding is what Socrates believes to be wisdom.

Thus, having wisdom being the director and guide for the good use of these benefits is what is necessary. Ignorance leads to incorrect use of said benefits. Here, we can see yet again how a man can see that being courageous is good. Yet, being ignorant of too much courage, he fails to see how it can harm him. So, it is understood that one who is guided by wisdom attains happiness and what is good and beneficial. For those who are ignorant, they will be guided to a miserable life. Socrates here suggests that virtue is a kind of wisdom, because virtue and wisdom are what guide a person. But if wisdom is knowledge, and virtue is a part of wisdom, then virtue is knowledge. 

However, we again come to a stumbling block, namely, because Socrates doubts whether virtue is taught. His reasoning for this is simple. Both Meno and Socrates name off a bunch of people who were thought to be virtuous. As an example of many, they use Themistocles and his son Cleophantus. Both men agree that Themistocles was a good and virtuous man, and his son was good at riding horses, yet when it comes to virtuous deeds and actions, Themistocles’ son was ignorant of them. From this, Socrates suggests that if virtue were teachable, it is most likely that Themistocles would’ve taught his son virtue, but he didn't. Socrates and Meno acknowledge that there is great confusion and debate within the intellectual circles, whether virtue can be taught; some think it can, others don’t think it can be taught. And so, if there is no general agreement about this, for Socrates, it means there are no teachers of virtue, since they cannot agree whether it can be taught or not. And since there are no teachers, it cannot be taught.

It is also agreed that many profess to teach a certain knowledge, such as virtue, yet when examined and questioned on the matter, they lack true knowledge of virtue. In a word, they give of the appearance of having virtue and can teach it, yet when describe what virtue is, they have no clue. We can clearly say that this is a problem; these people think that they know what virtue is and claim to teach it, but being misguided by what it is and having known knowledge of it, they do not know what virtue is.

I believe in affect this is what they describe as a sophist, of which many of them proclaim to teach what they do not know. Again, thanks to ignorance and what they think is right, lacking in wisdom, which the great guide, they miss the mark on virtue. So in a sense, those who claim to know what virtue is, lacking in wisdom, provide an opinion, not true knowledge of what virtue is. So, lacking in wisdom, to which they lack the knowledge of what they profess to teach, they neither know nor are they able to teach about the given subject they believe to know so much about. And seeing as though one cannot teach what one does not know, he is not a teacher because he is unable to convey true knowledge, which is teachable.

Seeing this is the case with virtue also, both Socrates and Meno seem to agree that there are no teachers of virtue.

Wisdom is the correct guide to virtue

Socrates and Meno seem to conclude that since there are no teachers of virtue, of which virtue is a good, there are no good men then. But from what we can observe, there are good people, as well as bad people. So, how does that work with the conclusion that there are no good men? 

Well, to begin with, we can say that we are not good men by nature, this is because virtue is not innate at birth. Since it is not innate, yet there are good and virtuous men, we must have gotten it somehow. We come to attain virtue not through direct teaching, like some kind of knowledge, but through guidance. This guidance comes under deep Socratic questioning from others and within yourself. In going such a rigorous method, we invoke the soul to recollect what it already knows about virtue. Through correct guidance of questions and wisdom, we attain virtue. However, virtue is not something that is taught in a traditional sense, but it can be taught by guiding others through the process of questioning, to which virtue is itself a guide. This can only be done effectively when one follows the method and is guided by wisdom.

In picking up from the dialogue, Socrates and Meno agree that knowledge and true opinion can lead to the right place. Knowledge, based on wisdom however, stands more firm and is a more accurate guide in one’s life. True opinion is a good guide, but due to it being an opinion, they fall prey to ignorance, and thus have their opinions change at a whim. Knowledge based on wisdom doesn’t allow this to happen; it stands firm against ignorance and opinions, being held firm in wisdom and truth. True opinion states what it is, true knowledge (wisdom) states what it is and why. To better illustrate his point, Socrates uses a navigator.

If someone wanted directions to Larissa and they asked a man who knew how to get to which he has also been to to Larissa, he would be considered a good guide. This is because the man knows what direction to take and has been there himself. This man can be said to have true knowledge and wisdom about how to get to Larissa. He has gained the wisdom on how to get there and has visited Larissa himself. So, this man can not only offer correct direction to Larissa but can accurately describe what Larissa is like and what it looks like. This wise guidance would offer the man who was looking for direction, wise guidance on how to get there, what it looks like, and what it is like in Larissa. For example, it can let the man know what the best paths to take are, describe the structure of the city, such as the buildings, and what the people are like. The man seeking directions has received wise guidance on how to get to Larissa with added knowledge, which is true. As to the man who gave such wise knowledge, he can be said to be wise.

Now, let’s say the man asks for directions from a man who knew where Larissa was, to whom he had a true opinion on how to get there, but has never been there himself. Although this man his correct in the direction he gives to the man to Larissa, he lacks true knowledge of the wisdom of Larissa is like and the shortcuts one can take. This man cannot offer what the terrain may be like, nor what the city looks like, or is like. Though having a true opinion about how to get to Larissa, he is wholly ignorant of the shortcuts, terrain, what the city looks like, and what it is like to be in the city. 

Though both men know how to get to Larissa, they are both equal. Of which the knowledge of the wise man, and the one who has a true opinion, is no different when it comes to directions. Where they differ is how both men are guided, one by wisdom, one by ignorance. The man guided by wisdom gives a more advanced guide on how to get there, what it looks like, and what the city is like. This is due to this man knowing not only how to get there, but also having been there himself. Whereas the man who has a true opinion about how to get there, though true in his belief, is ignorant of what the wise man knows and more. Again, this is because the man with the true opinion, though he knows the directions, has never been there himself. The wise man has true opinion and true understanding, whereas the other only has true opinion, not true understanding.

A wise sage

Using the example above, the wise man’s direction is more accurate and reliable than the one who only has a true opinion. This is because the wise can cross the threshold of direction and go into more details about the how, what, and why. The wise man can do this because he has wisdom (true understanding). The man whose true opinion, however, cannot cross that threshold, simply because his ignorance and lack of true understanding, of which he lacks wisdom, don’t allow him to. For if he tries to do so, he can only stick to opinion, which opinion itself ebbs and flows between truth and falsehood. To use an example, say the man with true opinion says to the man looking for guidance, about 3 miles from here, you will come across a mountain range. At this point, the man can only guess, but he passes it off as true knowledge of the thing he is ignorant of. Setting out on his journey 3 miles in, the man sees no mountain range. The man, shocked, will feel he has been lied to.

This same principle can be applied to all realms of wisdom and true opinions about a particular subject matter, including virtue. If we return to an earlier point, it was suggested that some profess to have virtue and can teach it. But then, upon further questioning (socratic method) there is ignorance is shown up. This is because they only possessed a true opinion of virtue, not a true understanding of it. In this case, they are being guided by ignorance, which can lead to either a true or false opinion. At the same time, wise people know what virtue is because they are guided by wisdom and can teach it to others. The man of true opinion will profess that they can teach virtue in a traditional sense by telling them what it is. Maybe they give a lecture, a speech, to write a book about it. Whereas the wise man teaches those, not by those means just mentioned. But by questioning them, and invoking the soul to recollect what they already know. They guide others to be guided by their innate wisdom, which the soul has.

The consequence on those who come to these people is simple: by the wise man with true understanding, they will come to possess virtue and be able to teach it to others in a way just mentioned. Whereas those who go to ones who have true opinion (sophists) will have a correct opinion, but not be virtuous themselves. Again, to return to an example of Themistocles and his son. Themistocles was unable to make his son virtuous, even though he was. This is because Themistocles had a true opinion, but lacked true understanding (wisdom) and so was unable to make his son virtuous. This is because he cannot teach what he lacks true understanding of.

The conclusion

So, to finally conclude, what is virtue in the eyes of both Socrates and Meno? 

Well, we can say what virtue isn't. Virtue is not acting by one’s natural disposition, such as sex, nor is it acting by one’s activity or profession. Neither is it, ruling over others or acquiring beautiful things, nor is it the power to do so. We arrived at the theory of recollection and how the soul is immortal, to which it possesses knowledge of all things which they are is also wise. Everything that we learn is merely recollection of the knowledge that the soul has gained through many lifetimes. We have discovered that wisdom is not a form of knowledge, but a guide, and since virtue is a part of or is wisdom, virtue is also a guide.

Wisdom and virtue are a guide that directs the good and wise soul, which influences their actions and what they say. But since wisdom is not knowledge but a guide, virtue can be taught, in the traditional sense of how knowledge is conveyed. Knowledge is teachable, but again, wisdom and virtue are not knowledge but a guide.

But since wisdom and virtue is not knowledge and is not teachable, how do people become wise and virtuous? Socrates and Meno conclude that one becomes wise and virtuous through guidance from the divine. Through recollection, the soul can come to remember what it had already forgotten, wisdom and virtue. Through careful examination of oneself, either by oneself or by the use of others. One can be guided using the Socratic method to attain this latent guidance. The way this guidance is conveyed to others, by questioning, is how you “teach” wisdom and virtue. Not by instruction, but through examination of one’s soul. To recollect the latent wisdom and virtue all souls have.

The way the one is guided is crucial to this. If one is guided by wisdom, they can arrive at correct understanding and possess wisdom about the given subject, in this case, virtue. As such, they can lead a virtuous life and guide others to attain virtue. In being guided by wisdom, they are not swayed by opinions of any sort. Now, if one is misguided by ignorance, they will lack true understanding and therefore, wisdom. But lacking in these crucial areas, they can only arrive at true opinion, and as such, are unable to cross the threshold into true understanding, so long as they remain ignorant. To remedy such a problem, one should be guided by their wise soul and not ignorance.

So, we can say that wisdom and virtue are not knowledge and therefore aren’t teachable. But, they are a form of guidance that can allow their souls to be guided by the innate virtue and wisdom their eternal soul has. But through said guidance, it can, in a way, become teachable, just not in the traditional manner. Depending on whether one is guided by wisdom or ignorance can determine whether one is virtuous and can direct and guide others. Depending on how wise or ignorant they are, it can influence how they teach or guide others and themselves. We can also see the difference between “seeming” and “being” within this dialogue. They who are wise can be said to have true understanding and wisdom (being), whereas the ignorant man, having a true opinion, “seems” to know what he doesn’t know, due to a lack of true understanding and wisdom.

A wise man guides, an ignorant man teaches what he does not know.

Is Socrates right in describing virtue?