Plato’s Meno - What is virtue?
The ancient ruins of the Parthenon, Athens, Greece
The following analysis of Plato’s Meno is based on the translation by G.M.A. Grube, found in The Complete Works of Plato, edited by John M. Cooper.
As is common in most Platonic dialogues, there is typically a preface or build-up regarding the conversation on a given subject. However, in Meno, we find an abrupt beginning, with Meno immediately asking Socrates, "Can virtue be taught? Can we learn it by practice, or do some people have it by nature, and therefore it can neither be taught nor gained by experience?"
Meno is a significant interlocutor in this dialogue. Hailing from Thessaly, which has friendly relations with Athens, he shares common political interests with the city. The importance of Meno as an interlocutor cannot be overstated. As a young man aspiring to a long career in politics, he is eager to understand the nature of virtue. This is crucial, as his display of virtue will directly impact his political career. To succeed in this endeavour, he must not only exhibit virtuous leadership but also comprehend what virtue entails. This understanding is vital for Meno, as his possession of virtue will influence how he leads and governs others in a political role. Consequently, he seeks Socrates' insights on the nature of virtue to ensure a successful career in politics.
It is also noteworthy that Meno comes from an aristocratic family. Interestingly, Socrates, who grew up in a democratic society, was often suspected of leaning towards aristocratic political views. Although he was not, he was perceived as sympathetic to the aristocracy of his time.
Socrates’ association with prominent citizens, such as Alcibiades and Critias, often leads to interpretations of him as embracing certain aristocratic ideals. This becomes even more apparent when we consider that Alcibiades, driven by personal gain and power, defected to Sparta and was viewed as a traitor by the Athenians, while Critias was one of the thirty tyrants who overthrew the democratic regime. Nonetheless, Socrates’ disdain for wealth and status, as evident in his teachings, aligns more closely with a democratic ethos than with aristocratic principles. He famously stated that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” promoting a life of virtue and wisdom over one of privilege. Caring little for wealth, property, and fame, he valued wisdom and virtue more highly. This strong desire for wisdom and virtue, coupled with his disdain for wealth and luxuries, precludes him from being considered aristocratic in his social standing or beliefs.
Socrates’ ideals were more aligned with a wise and virtuous life, which ought to be governed by such principles. This stands in stark contrast to democracy (rule by the many) and aristocracy (rule by a family). As such, Socrates would not have advocated for either regime, as both clash with his ideals. He did not believe that power should reside with the majority without recourse to wisdom and reason. Likewise, he would not have believed that power should lie with someone solely because they come from a particular family, as such a family does not always possess wisdom and virtue. However, a life guided by wisdom and virtue is indifferent to both regimes.
Having provided some context, let us now discuss the nature of virtue according to Socrates and Meno.
The discussion begins
So, as previously mentioned, Meno begins the discussion by asking Socrates, "Can virtue be taught, learned through experience, or is it something inherent that only a few possess?" To this, Socrates, employing a degree of Socratic irony, admits that he does not know what virtue is, let alone its nature. This aligns with Socratic thought, where he professes ignorance about many things. Had he provided an answer, it would imply that he understands what virtue is when he does not. Therefore, as a compromise, Socrates and Meno engage in the Socratic method to ascertain the nature of virtue. To illustrate his ignorance regarding virtue, Socrates presents an example: if he does not know Meno, can he describe qualities unique to Meno that are true? The answer is no. In a similar vein, Socrates, lacking knowledge of virtue, is unable to articulate its essence.
The intriguing aspect of Socrates professing ignorance (in this instance, regarding virtue) is his acute awareness of the limitations of his knowledge. Where he is considered wise, much to his dismay, is in his recognition of this fact. Furthermore, even if Socrates were to possess an understanding of virtue and its nature, rather than providing a direct answer, he invites others into a dialectical discussion. By doing so, Socrates believes that through his Socratic method, he can elicit the truth from both others and himself. As will be demonstrated later, this form of questioning serves as a type of wise guidance. Thus, Socrates endeavours to place Meno under this form of guidance, beginning by asking Meno what virtue is, given his own profound ignorance.
Meno’s First Answer - Virtue is Acting in One’s Natural Role
Meno’s initial response posits that virtue is a form of natural duty that individuals fulfil according to their sex or stage of life. Consequently, Meno views virtue as a dynamic duty that varies with sex, age, activity, and profession. According to Meno’s first response, virtue is relative to the individual and adjusts based on their circumstances in life. To further illustrate his point, he provides numerous examples pertaining to men, women, children, and others, which are as follows:
For a man, virtue is the ability to manage public affairs; by doing so, he benefits his friends and harms his enemies while avoiding harm to himself. The virtue of a woman is to care for the household, preserve possessions, and be submissive to her husband. This differing conception of virtue also applies to children, elderly slaves, and others. It is evident that Meno perceives virtue as a natural function that individuals must embody and perform according to their innate endowments. Regardless of one's station, sex, or occupation in life, Meno asserts that individuals must act in accordance with their natural virtue. For a politician, this would entail enacting laws, among other responsibilities.
In my view, Meno appears to consider both a natural virtue applicable to men and women, as well as a professional or occupational aspect of virtue. Consequently, I believe Meno’s initial response is grounded in a dynamic and evolving understanding of virtue, which is not inherently static. This dynamic and relative perspective on virtue stands in contrast to the belief in a universal virtue that everyone ought to aspire to, which would be fixed and absolute.
Meno's first answer, being relative, suggests that virtue can be seen as subjective, without reference to a universal standard. However, this response is overly simplistic and vague. It does not adequately define what virtue is but rather provides examples of virtuous actions. Furthermore, this aligns with relativism, which can lead to a misunderstanding of the true nature of virtue.
While Socrates finds Meno’s response somewhat admirable, he seeks to understand the essence of virtue rather than a multitude of examples. Essentially, Socrates aims to uncover the very nature of virtue itself; while there may be many virtues, he is primarily concerned with virtue in its entirety, rather than its individual aspects. To clarify his inquiry, Socrates suggests that if one were trying to comprehend the nature of bees, one would not focus on the differences between them; instead, one would describe the universal characteristics that apply to all bees. To emphasise his point to Meno, Socrates presents numerous virtues that apply to both men and women, as well as children and slaves. Examples include strength and health. It is clear that Socrates is not interested in semantics or specific instances; rather, he seeks to understand the universal essence of virtue that encompasses all examples.
From this initial response, a distinction emerges between the pursuit of truth regarding virtue and other matters. Meno approaches the question by arguing from specific instances to a broader understanding of virtue. Consequently, he arrives at a relative interpretation of virtue, offering examples that vary according to sex, profession, and natural endowment. In contrast, Socrates posits that virtue is a universal standard applicable to all, which may include additional dimensions of virtue. He focuses on the overarching concept of virtue, which transcends individual examples, as the parts contribute to the whole. Socrates seeks to understand the entirety of virtue rather than its individual components. Therefore, despite its admirable and generous nature, Socrates finds Meno’s first response inadequate on these grounds.
Meno’s Second Answer - Justice and the Concept of Ruling Over Others
Following the discussion of why Meno’s first response was insufficient to define virtue, the conversation transitions to the concept of ruling over others, in which justice is examined.
Both Meno and Socrates engage in a discussion regarding the nature of governance, both at the household and city levels. A central theme that emerges from their dialogue is the concept of justice. Both individuals concur that justice, tempered by moderation, is essential for the effective governance of both a household and a city. They assert that the absence of these qualities would hinder the proper administration of both entities. Thus, it is evident that justice is a fundamental element in the governance of people.
This discourse on leadership resonates particularly with the young Meno, who aspires to a career in politics. Justice is pivotal as it falls under the broader category of virtue. Therefore, to govern justly is to embody virtue. Conversely, ignorance and a deficiency in virtue can lead both individuals and states to decline, while virtue promotes growth, health, and prosperity.
It is established by both Socrates and Meno that justice and moderation are crucial for effective governance, whether it pertains to a city or a household. Moreover, they agree that both men and women, regardless of age, can embody these qualities of moderation and justice. Since justice and moderation are integral aspects of virtue, which are not contingent upon gender or profession, it follows that anyone can possess virtue. However, as previously discussed, Socrates seeks to understand virtue in its entirety, rather than merely its components, such as justice and moderation. Both Socrates and Meno concur that possessing virtue and its associated qualities, including justice, signifies goodness, whereas the absence of these qualities, and thus virtue, denotes a lack of goodness. After a brief examination of the qualities and virtues, and the notion that virtue is consistent regardless of gender or other factors, Meno proposes that virtue consists of ruling over others.
Unsurprisingly, Socrates finds this second proposition unsatisfactory and articulates his reasons for this position.
As demonstrated in the discussion with Meno, anyone who possesses the qualities of virtue is virtuous by nature. This universal principle applies to slaves as well; however, a slave is someone who is ruled rather than a ruler. Yet, as Meno acknowledges, virtue can be possessed by anyone, including slaves. For instance, a slave can exhibit qualities such as justice, moderation, and goodness. However, according to Meno, virtue is defined as ruling over others; how, then, can this apply to a slave? Meno appears to contradict himself because, on one hand, he asserts that virtue can be possessed by anyone, yet on the other hand, he states that virtue is ruling over others, which is the position of a ruler rather than a slave.
In light of this example, Meno must abandon one of two positions. He must either relinquish the notion that virtue consists of ruling over others or that virtue can be held by anyone; ultimately, he opts to abandon the former. This becomes more evident when we consider that those who rule can become tyrants and lack virtue. Therefore, virtue cannot simply be equated with ruling over others. Meno compromises by suggesting that virtue is ruling justly, which excludes the possibility of a bad person possessing virtue. While this seems reasonable, Socrates remains unsatisfied; once again, we find ourselves returning to the last objection regarding Meno’s initial response. The crux of the matter is that Socrates seeks an understanding of virtue as a whole rather than merely a component of it. Since justice is a part of virtue, the definition of ruling justly cannot adequately describe virtue in its entirety. Simply ruling is insufficient, nor is ruling with justice enough to define virtue, as the former allows for the possibility of bad rulers, and the latter is merely a component of virtue. What is sought is a definition of virtue that encompasses all its aspects, including justice.
I believe Socrates is correct in raising such objections. We seek to understand virtue as a whole rather than its individual components, which Meno has only provided. Virtue is a universal standard that governs all good actions and qualities of actions. However, we cannot comprehend virtue in its entirety by merely examining examples of it. When attempting to understand a chair, for instance, we cannot limit ourselves to observing just one leg; we must consider all its parts and the essence that warrants the designation "chair."
Once again, Socrates emphasises this point to Meno concerning the components of virtue, addressing those aspects that are not pertinent to identifying what virtue is as a whole. Socrates offers further examples, this time utilising shapes and colours to illustrate his argument.
For example, if one wishes to understand what shape and colour are, we would not simply provide an instance of a shape or a colour; instead, we would define the concepts of colour and shape in relation to all shapes and all colours. When asking someone what a shape is, if they respond with "circle," they are not accurately describing what a shape is in general but are merely offering a specific example involving circles. For Socrates, the part does not define the whole; rather, it is the whole that defines the part.
Thus far, the answers provided have proven inadequate for Socrates, as they describe only the components of virtue rather than its entirety, which is his primary interest. The assertion that ruling over others constitutes virtue is unsatisfactory because both a slave and a ruler can possess virtue. Similarly, stating that being just is synonymous with virtue is incorrect, as it merely identifies a component of virtue (justice) rather than encompassing the whole (virtue). Following this refutation, Meno attempts to offer a different definition of virtue. It is evident, based on the discussion thus far, that Socrates is arguing from a universal perspective, wherein a definition or nature of a concept delineates its potential components. Socrates is less concerned with the individual parts when articulating what a concept is in itself. In contrast, Meno utilises specific instances to describe the whole. Both men aim to comprehend what virtue is, albeit from differing approaches. Socrates seeks a fixed definition of what something is, while Meno leans towards a more relativistic perspective, wherein the definition and application of virtue may vary.
Let us proceed to Meno's third response.
Meno's Third Answer - Virtue is Desiring Beautiful Things and the Power to Acquire Them
Building on the previous responses, Meno posits that virtue consists of desiring beautiful things and possessing the ability to acquire them. Socrates and Meno subsequently agree that individuals can desire both good and bad things. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that some individuals understand what is good and desire it, while others pursue what they mistakenly believe to be good, which is actually bad. In the latter case, they lack true knowledge of what they desire; although they perceive it as good, it is, in fact, detrimental. As previously established, what is good is virtuous, while what is bad is not.
Consequently, if a person attains what is bad, they cannot be considered virtuous. Therefore, the mere act of desiring beautiful things and having the capacity to acquire them cannot, in isolation, constitute virtue. This is because if an individual lacks knowledge of what they believe to be beautiful, they may inadvertently achieve something harmful. Thus, to assert that virtue is merely the desire for what is beautiful is insufficient without true knowledge. Without this knowledge, the uninformed individual remains unaware of the potential harm that a detrimental object of desire, which they believe to be good, could inflict upon them. For all they know, their desire may seem virtuous, yet in reality, it is harmful; due to their ignorance, they lack awareness of the damage they could inflict upon themselves.
Moreover, it is observed that if a person does not recognise that something is bad, they cannot desire what is bad, as they lack the requisite knowledge. Similarly, if they are unaware of what is good, they cannot desire it. Given that what is evil results in misery and harm, it is difficult to assume that an individual would willingly seek out things that cause them suffering. Therefore, since misery and harm are undesirable—things that no one would consciously wish for—it follows that no one truly desires what is bad. They may inadvertently acquire what is bad due to their ignorance of its nature.
Based on the discussion thus far, the desirous aspect of Meno’s answer is called into question. Socrates observes that anyone can desire anything, regardless of age, wisdom, or ignorance. Since this desirous aspect is shared by all individuals, including those who are ignorant, they may unknowingly desire what is harmful, which, as we have established, is not aligned with virtue, as virtue represents what is good. Thus, it follows that virtue cannot be merely defined as the desire for beautiful things. However, what about the ability to acquire these things, as suggested in Meno’s response?
Having challenged the notion that virtue is simply the desire for beautiful things, Socrates inquires of Meno, "Is virtue the power to acquire beautiful things?" to which Meno replies, "Yes." Similar to his earlier critique, Socrates identifies flaws in this assertion as well.
To clarify his position, Socrates prompts Meno to provide further explanation. He asks, "Do these beautiful things include health and wealth?" Meno affirms this. "What about gold and silver?" Again, Meno agrees. However, since a bad or ignorant individual can possess the capacity to attain these things without a true understanding of what is genuinely beautiful, both Socrates and Meno concur that there is an element of impiety and injustice in acquiring such things, which is inherently wicked. As previously established, virtue represents what is good, and injustice is bad. Therefore, since virtue is not synonymous with injustice, an unjust individual cannot possess virtue. This leads to the conclusion that someone with the ability to acquire things can embody either virtue or injustice, resulting in their classification as good or bad, respectively. Thus, simply stating that virtue is the power to acquire these things is insufficient.
As a potential resolution, Meno and Socrates propose that virtue is the acquisition of these things while maintaining justice and moderation. However, this presents a problem: Meno is offering a subset of virtue to define the entirety of virtue. Socrates, as previously mentioned, is not inclined to define virtue in terms of its parts. Consequently, they find themselves back at square one.
Meno has thus far only provided Socrates with fragments, actions, and qualities of virtue, rather than a comprehensive definition of what virtue is as a whole. All of these have proven insufficient in defining virtue in its entirety. It appears that both men are at a loss regarding the essence of virtue. After exchanging some light-hearted remarks, where Meno likens Socrates to a torpedo fish and Socrates expresses his genuine perplexity, they return to the issue at hand. It is noteworthy that Meno accuses Socrates of intentionally confusing others, comparing him to a torpedo fish that stings anyone it encounters with perplexity. In his defence, Socrates asserts that he does not do this on purpose, as he is genuinely confused about such matters. Consequently, others share in this state of perplexity, which arises from Socrates' admission of ignorance. Thus, Socrates invites others to join him on his quest for truth, an endeavour that they agree to undertake, albeit one that can be bewildering.
The Theory of Recollection
At this point, both Socrates and Meno are utterly perplexed regarding the nature of virtue; they are equally baffled. What has been discussed thus far consists of aspects of virtue or elements that do not constitute virtue itself. Therefore, Meno revisits the original question that initiated the dialogue: Is virtue taught, inherent, or acquired through experience? Socrates agrees to revisit this point, but Meno contends that if a person knows something, he does not need to search for what he already knows. However, if he does not know, how can he seek something that is unknown to him? Socrates disagrees with this reasoning and endeavours to demonstrate why.
At this juncture, we encounter the renowned theory of recollection. Although elaborated in greater detail elsewhere in The Phaedo, a concise discussion is warranted here. Socrates refers to the insights of various poets and diviners who assert the immortality of the soul. The soul undergoes a cycle of rebirth, assimilating knowledge from previous lifetimes; consequently, any form of learning or knowledge we acquire is derived from prior existences. When we “learn new knowledge,” we are, in fact, merely recollecting what we already possess. For Socrates, the process of learning is not about acquisition but rather the remembrance of knowledge that resides dormant within our immortal soul. To illustrate this concept, Socrates requests that Meno summon one of his household attendants to provide evidence for this assertion.
A depiction of Socrates
To substantiate his argument, Socrates offers a series of mathematical and geometrical puzzles for the young attendant to solve. Although somewhat hesitant, the young man consents to participate. The primary objective of this exercise is for Socrates to elicit the latent knowledge residing within the young man's soul regarding these puzzles. Throughout the exercise, the young man is initially unaware of certain problems; however, through a process of questioning, Socrates is able to draw correct answers from him. This is achieved solely based on the young man’s own insights, without any external assistance in the form of correct answers.
Socrates reassures Meno that by posing the right questions, we can uncover any true answer from an individual, as their soul inherently possesses such knowledge. Initially, a person may assert that they do not know something (overlooking the knowledge within their soul), but with proper questioning, we can extract the correct answers from them. In this manner, an individual can come to understand what they previously did not know, effectively re-remembering what their soul already comprehends. This is exemplified by the attendant's journey to true knowledge about the puzzles, revealing correct answers through the Socratic method.
Socrates and Meno concur that if the soul possesses knowledge, such as that of mathematics, it must have always held this knowledge. If this knowledge has not been imparted in one's current life yet has always existed, it follows that it must have been possessed prior to birth. Upon reaching this agreement, the only remaining conclusion is that the soul is immortal and has always possessed such knowledge from previous lifetimes, which is carried over into the present one.
In a somewhat lengthy and intricate manner, Socrates has elucidated how knowledge is attained, primarily through recollection. We have addressed the question of whether an individual can come to know what they did not previously know, specifically through recollection. Thus, an individual can indeed arrive at knowledge of what they did not know before; by learning, we refer to the recollection of the latent knowledge contained within the soul.
At first glance, this appears satisfactory; however, they have not defined what virtue is but rather described its qualities, asserting that knowledge is recollection. They have both articulated what knowledge is and how it is acquired. Nevertheless, Socrates remains uncertain as to whether virtue equates to knowledge. Meno again implores Socrates to return to the original question, but Socrates hesitates, as Meno is seeking qualities of virtue rather than a comprehensive definition of virtue itself. However, Socrates ultimately relents and endeavours to further question Meno.
Is virtue knowledge? And is it teachable?
Thus far, I believe Socrates has addressed the question of whether virtue is innate, affirming that it is. The rationale for its innateness lies in the soul's experience of multiple lifetimes, during which it has acquired knowledge and experiences, including virtue. Although Socrates does not believe that individuals are virtuous by nature—mainly because we forget our prior knowledge, including virtue, at birth—he posits that virtue is latent within the soul. The reason we do not exhibit virtue is that we forget this aspect of knowledge. Only when someone "learns (remembers)" this innate knowledge of virtue do they become virtuous. Socrates further asserts that a person who claims ignorance is, in fact, already aware of this knowledge within them; however, at the moment of lacking knowledge, they remain oblivious to this latent understanding. Through guided questioning, an individual who was previously unaware can come to recognise what they have always known. If this knowledge has always resided within the soul, it must have endured through many lifetimes, thereby affirming its immortality.
With this perspective, we return to the dialogue where both Meno and Socrates attempt to resolve the question of whether virtue is a form of thought.
Initially, they seek to determine whether virtue constitutes a form of knowledge and is, therefore, teachable. Socrates and Meno agree that knowledge is indeed something that can be taught. Thus, if virtue is a form of knowledge, it can, by extension, be taught. However, if virtue is not knowledge, then it cannot be taught. This brings them to the discussion regarding whether virtue is knowledge.
It is agreed that virtue is synonymous with goodness, rendering an individual good and bestowing various benefits upon them for being virtuous. It is also recognised that knowledge embodies a form of good; however, if virtue, as a form of good, is distinct from knowledge, then it cannot be classified as knowledge. Conversely, if both virtue and knowledge are considered good, and knowledge encompasses all forms of good, including virtue, then virtue is indeed knowledge. With this framework in place, Socrates begins to explore whether virtue is an independent good or a component of knowledge that contributes to its goodness. If knowledge encompasses virtue, then it is classified as knowledge and can be taught. Conversely, if it is separate from knowledge and good independently, then it is not knowledge but rather something else. It is agreed that virtue and knowledge share in common what is good.
Socrates and Meno begin to utilise this framework to examine whether virtue is knowledge and, consequently, teachable.
To start with, Socrates identifies several things that can benefit us while simultaneously causing us harm. For example, courage is an inherently good virtue; however, excessive courage can lead to harm, specifically through rashness and recklessness. This dualistic nature of what is good and what can cause harm is further exemplified when these qualities are misapplied. Thus, it becomes clear that a certain level of understanding of this nature and the proper application of these qualities is necessary. This correct understanding is what Socrates believes constitutes wisdom.
Therefore, having wisdom as the director and guide for the beneficial use of these qualities is essential. Ignorance results in the incorrect use of these benefits. Here, we see once again how a person can recognise that courage is good yet, through ignorance of its potential excess, fail to perceive how it might harm him. It is thus understood that one who is guided by wisdom achieves happiness and what is good and beneficial, while those who are ignorant are led to a miserable existence. Socrates suggests that virtue is a kind of wisdom because both virtue and wisdom serve as guides for an individual. If wisdom is knowledge and virtue is a component of wisdom, then virtue can be regarded as knowledge.
However, we encounter a stumbling block, as Socrates questions whether virtue is indeed teachable. His reasoning is straightforward. Both Meno and Socrates identify several individuals who were considered virtuous. For instance, they cite Themistocles and his son Cleophantus. Both men agree that Themistocles was a good and virtuous man, and although his son excelled in horse riding, he lacked knowledge of virtuous deeds and actions. From this, Socrates infers that if virtue were teachable, it is likely that Themistocles would have imparted virtue to his son, yet he did not. Socrates and Meno recognise that there is significant confusion and debate within intellectual circles regarding whether virtue can be taught; some believe it can, while others disagree. Thus, in the absence of general consensus on this matter, Socrates concludes that there are no teachers of virtue, as they cannot agree on whether it can be taught. And if there are no teachers, it follows that virtue cannot be taught.
It is also acknowledged that many claim to teach a certain knowledge, such as virtue, yet when scrutinised, they lack a true understanding of it. In essence, they present the appearance of possessing virtue and the ability to teach it, yet when asked to define what virtue is, they are at a loss. This presents a clear problem; these individuals believe they understand virtue and assert that they can teach it, but due to their misguided notions and lack of knowledge, they do not comprehend what virtue truly is.
I believe this exemplifies what is often described as a sophist, many of whom profess to teach what they do not genuinely understand. Again, due to ignorance and their misguided beliefs, lacking wisdom—the essential guide—they miss the mark regarding virtue. Thus, those who assert that they know what virtue is, while lacking wisdom, can only provide an opinion, not true knowledge of virtue. Therefore, lacking wisdom, which involves a lack of understanding of what they profess to teach, they are neither knowledgeable nor capable of teaching the subject they claim to know so well. Since one cannot teach what one does not know, they cannot be regarded as teachers because they are unable to convey true knowledge, which is teachable.
Given that this is also the case with virtue, both Socrates and Meno appear to concur that there are no teachers of virtue.
Wisdom is the Correct Guide to Virtue
Socrates and Meno seem to conclude that since there are no teachers of virtue, and virtue is good, there are consequently no good men. However, from our observations, we witness the existence of good people as well as bad people. So, how does this align with the conclusion that there are no good men?
To begin with, we can assert that we are not inherently good men; this is because virtue is not innate at birth. Since it is not innate, yet there are good and virtuous individuals, we must attain it through some means. We come to acquire virtue not through direct teaching, as one would with knowledge, but through guidance. This guidance is facilitated by deep Socratic questioning from others and within ourselves. By engaging in such rigorous discourse, we prompt the soul to recollect what it already knows about virtue. Through appropriate guidance in questioning and wisdom, we attain virtue. However, virtue is not something that is taught in the traditional sense; rather, it can be imparted by guiding others through the process of questioning, to which virtue itself serves as a guide. This can only be effectively achieved when one adheres to the method and is guided by wisdom.
Continuing from the dialogue, Socrates and Meno agree that knowledge and true opinion can lead one in the right direction. Knowledge, grounded in wisdom, however, is a more stable and accurate guide in one’s life. While true opinion provides a good guide, its subjective nature leaves one vulnerable to ignorance, causing opinions to shift easily. Knowledge based on wisdom prevents this; it remains steadfast against ignorance and opinion, being anchored in wisdom and truth. True opinion conveys what it is; true knowledge (wisdom) conveys what it is and why. To further illustrate his point, Socrates employs the example of a navigator.
If someone sought directions to Larissa and asked a man who knew the way and had been to Larissa, he would be regarded as a good guide. This is because the man knows which direction to take and has personal experience of the journey. This individual possesses true knowledge and wisdom regarding how to reach Larissa, having gained insight through experience. Thus, he can not only provide accurate directions but can also describe what Larissa is like and what it looks like. This wise guidance would offer the seeker comprehensive information about the best routes, the city's structure, and the nature of its inhabitants. The man seeking directions receives wise guidance on how to reach Larissa, enhanced by true knowledge. The man providing such insightful knowledge can be deemed wise.
Now, suppose the seeker requests directions from a man who knows where Larissa is and possesses a true opinion on how to get there but has never visited. Although this man provides correct directions, he lacks true knowledge of the wisdom regarding Larissa, including potential shortcuts. This individual is unable to offer insights about the terrain or the city's appearance and atmosphere. While he may hold a true opinion on how to reach Larissa, he is entirely ignorant of the nuances that the wise man understands.
Although both men can direct one towards Larissa, they are not equal. The knowledge of the wise man and that of the individual with a true opinion differ in terms of guidance; one is guided by wisdom, while the other is guided by ignorance. The man led by wisdom provides a more comprehensive guide, detailing not only how to get there but also what the city is like. This is due to his knowledge of the route, coupled with firsthand experience of Larissa. In contrast, the man with the true opinion, although correct in his directions, is unaware of the additional insights that the wise man possesses. The wise man possesses both true opinion and true understanding, whereas the other only possesses true opinion, devoid of true understanding.
A wise sage
Using the example above, the wise man’s direction is more accurate and reliable than that of one who possesses only a true opinion. This is because the wise individual can cross the threshold of direction and delve into greater detail regarding the how, what, and why. The wise man is capable of this because he possesses wisdom (true understanding). In contrast, the individual with a true opinion cannot cross that threshold; his ignorance and lack of true understanding, stemming from a deficiency in wisdom, prevent him from doing so. If he attempts to do so, he can only rely on opinion, which fluctuates between truth and falsehood. For example, suppose the man with a true opinion tells the seeker of guidance, “About 3 miles from here, you will come across a mountain range.” At this point, the man can only guess, yet he presents it as true knowledge of that which he is ignorant. Upon embarking on his journey, after 3 miles, he sees no mountain range. The man, shocked, will feel he has been deceived.
This same principle can be applied to all realms of wisdom and true opinions regarding a particular subject matter, including virtue. If we return to an earlier point, it was suggested that some claim to possess virtue and to be able to teach it. However, upon further questioning (using the Socratic method), their ignorance is revealed. This is because they only possess a true opinion of virtue, not a true understanding of it. In this case, they are guided by ignorance, which can lead to either a true or false opinion. Conversely, wise individuals understand what virtue is because they are guided by wisdom and can teach it to others. The man of true opinion may assert that he can teach virtue in a conventional sense by explaining what it is. He might deliver a lecture, give a speech, or write a book about it. In contrast, the wise man teaches others not through these conventional means, but by questioning them and invoking the soul to recollect what it already knows. He guides others to be led by their innate wisdom, which resides within their souls.
The consequence for those who seek guidance from these individuals is straightforward: through the wise man with true understanding, they will come to possess virtue and be able to teach it to others in the manner described. In contrast, those who turn to individuals with true opinion (sophists) will hold a correct opinion but will not themselves be virtuous. Again, returning to the example of Themistocles and his son, Themistocles was unable to instil virtue in his son, despite his own virtue. This is because Themistocles had a true opinion but lacked true understanding (wisdom) and therefore was unable to make his son virtuous. He cannot teach what he does not truly understand.
The conclusion
Using the example above, the wise man’s direction is more accurate and reliable than that of one who possesses only a true opinion. This is because the wise individual can cross the threshold of direction and delve into greater detail regarding the how, what, and why. The wise man is capable of this because he possesses wisdom (true understanding). In contrast, the individual with a true opinion cannot cross that threshold; his ignorance and lack of true understanding, stemming from a deficiency in wisdom, prevent him from doing so. If he attempts to do so, he can only rely on opinion, which fluctuates between truth and falsehood. For example, suppose the man with a true opinion tells the seeker of guidance, “About 3 miles from here, you will come across a mountain range.” At this point, the man can only guess, yet he presents it as true knowledge of that which he is ignorant. Upon embarking on his journey, after 3 miles, he sees no mountain range. The man, shocked, will feel he has been deceived.
This same principle can be applied to all realms of wisdom and true opinions regarding a particular subject matter, including virtue. If we return to an earlier point, it was suggested that some claim to possess virtue and to be able to teach it. However, upon further questioning (using the Socratic method), their ignorance is revealed. This is because they only possess a true opinion of virtue, not a true understanding of it. In this case, they are guided by ignorance, which can lead to either a true or false opinion. Conversely, wise individuals understand what virtue is because they are guided by wisdom and can teach it to others. The man of true opinion may assert that he can teach virtue in a conventional sense by explaining what it is. He might deliver a lecture, give a speech, or write a book about it. In contrast, the wise man teaches others not through these conventional means, but by questioning them and invoking the soul to recollect what it already knows. He guides others to be led by their innate wisdom, which resides within their souls.
The consequence for those who seek guidance from these individuals is straightforward: through the wise man with true understanding, they will come to possess virtue and be able to teach it to others in the manner described. In contrast, those who turn to individuals with true opinion (sophists) will hold a correct opinion but will not themselves be virtuous. Again, returning to the example of Themistocles and his son, Themistocles was unable to instil virtue in his son, despite his own virtue. This is because Themistocles had a true opinion but lacked true understanding (wisdom) and therefore was unable to make his son virtuous. He cannot teach what he does not truly understand.
The conclusion
To conclude, what is virtue in the eyes of both Socrates and Meno?
We can begin by stating what virtue is not. Virtue is not acting according to one’s natural disposition, such as sexuality, nor is it determined by one’s occupation or profession. It is neither ruling over others nor acquiring beautiful things, nor is it the power to do so. We arrived at the theory of recollection and the notion that the soul is immortal, possessing knowledge of all things, which is also wise. Everything we learn is merely a recollection of the knowledge that the soul has acquired through many lifetimes. We have discovered that wisdom is not a form of knowledge but rather a guide; since virtue is a part of or is wisdom, it too serves as a guide.
Wisdom and virtue act as a guide that directs the good and wise soul, influencing their actions and speech. However, since wisdom is not knowledge but a guide, virtue cannot be taught in the traditional sense of how knowledge is conveyed. Knowledge is teachable, but wisdom and virtue are not knowledge; they are guides.
Given that wisdom and virtue are not knowledge and therefore not teachable, how do individuals become wise and virtuous? Socrates and Meno conclude that one becomes wise and virtuous through divine guidance. Through recollection, the soul can remember what it had previously forgotten: wisdom and virtue. Through careful self-examination, either independently or with the help of others, one can be guided using the Socratic method to attain this latent guidance. The method of conveying this guidance to others, through questioning, is how one “teaches” wisdom and virtue—not through instruction, but through the examination of one’s soul to recollect the latent wisdom and virtue inherent in all souls.
The manner in which one is guided is crucial to this process. If one is guided by wisdom, they can arrive at correct understanding and possess wisdom regarding the subject at hand, in this case, virtue. Thus, they can lead a virtuous life and guide others to attain virtue. When guided by wisdom, they are not swayed by opinions of any kind. Conversely, if one is misled by ignorance, they will lack true understanding and, therefore, wisdom. Lacking these crucial areas, they can only arrive at true opinion and, as such, are unable to cross the threshold into true understanding as long as they remain ignorant. To remedy this issue, one should be guided by their wise soul rather than by ignorance.
Therefore, we can assert that wisdom and virtue are not knowledge and thus not directly teachable. However, they are a form of guidance that allows individuals' souls to be directed by the innate virtue and wisdom their eternal souls possess. Through this guidance, it can, in a manner of speaking, become teachable, albeit not in the traditional sense. Whether one is guided by wisdom or ignorance can determine whether one is virtuous and capable of directing and guiding others. The extent of their wisdom or ignorance can influence how they teach or guide both themselves and others. We can also observe the distinction between “seeming” and “being” within this dialogue. Those who are wise can be said to have true understanding and wisdom (being), whereas the ignorant man, possessing only a true opinion, “seems” to know what he does not, due to a lack of true understanding and wisdom.
A wise man guides; an ignorant man teaches what he does not know.
Is Socrates correct in his description of virtue?
